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REEXAMINING THE GENDER IMPLICATIONS OF 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: How HIGHER CEILINGS ON 
INDIVIDUAL DONATIONS DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT 
FEMALE CANDIDATES 
By Ashley Baker* 
r 11 he Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA"), signed 
by the President and enacted into law on March 27, 
..-.. 2002, capped a seven-year effort by its Congressional 
sponsors to change federal campaign law and marked the most 
significant amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act 
("FECA") in more than a quarter-century. BCRA's two pillars 
are its prohibition on the raising and spending of "soft money" 
by federal officeholders and candidates and its redefinition of 
what constitutes a campaign advertisement. Proponents of 
BCRA lauded its potential to address the corruptive effects of 
money in politics while opponents of BCRA decried its impact 
on the First Amendment rights of candidates and their contribu-
tors. 
Reform legislation focused solely on corruption ignores the 
reality that exploding campaign costs and obstacles to effective 
fundraising by female candidates cre-
ate severe barriers to political partici-
pation. While corruption is a valid 
concern, the effects of campaign fi-
nance legislation are no less insidious. 
One need only glance at the composi-
tion of the 109th U.S. Senate to find 
them: one African American, two Pa-
cific Islanders, three Latinos, 14 
women and 80 White American men. 1 
Consequently, assuming a priori that 
the government may impose reason-
able restrictions on the fundraising ability of candidates,2 this 
Article seeks to develop an equal protection analysis of cam-
paign finance reform by considering the effects of BCRA on 
minority, particularly female, candidates for the Senate. 
The first part of this article develops the theoretical under-
pinnings of the argument that campaign finance law impairs the 
equal protection rights of female candidates. I briefly consider 
the historical application of equal protection law in the arena of 
elections and political campaigns and then situate campaign 
finance within that jurisprudence. Second, this essay offers em-
pirical evidence demonstrating both the gendered component to 
candidate fundraising in U.S. Senate elections and the extent to 
which campaign finance laws, exemplified by § 307 of BCRA 
which increased individual contribution limits from $1,000 to 
$2,000,3 affect the relative ability of men and women to fund-
raise and campaign successfully. Third, I combine this data 
with the theoretical arguments of the first section to articulate 
plified by § 307, operate in conjunction with gender disparities 
in a fundraising capacity to impair the relative ability of women 
to run for office. Fianlly, this article considers the legislative 
application of this argument. 
The Supreme Court has affirmed both the right to equal 
participation of all voters and the right to a results-oriented de-
termination of whether this right has been infringed.4 In recent 
decades, campaign finance has emerged as the new battleground 
in the struggle for equality in the political arena. Most discus-
sions of campaign finance discrimination have focused on the 
individual level of the citizen voter or contributor.5 However, 
the campaign finance system is also suspect from the candi-
dates' perspective to the extent that it impairs a candidate's abil-
ity to run, successfully, for office. 
The Court has consistently afforded 
protection of the absolute right of can-
didates to pursue elective office. Sup-
port for this right generally derives 
from the First Amendment and judi-
cial recognition that running for office 
is a political activity vital to political 
advocacy and expression. However, 
courts have also recognized that re-
strictions on political participation 
implicate a candidate's rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.6 
In particular, the Court has consistently recognized and ex-
pressed hostility to economic discrimination against political 
candidates. In Bullock v. Carter, the Supreme Court invalidated, 
on equal protection grounds, a primary election filing fee that 
required candidates to pay upwards of $6,000 to gain access to 
the ballot. 7 The Court held that economic discrimination is an 
unconstitutional barrier to political participation because it 
"substantially limits" the voter's choice of candidates.8 Simi-
larly, in Lubin v. Panish, the Court held that California could not 
deprive an indigent citizen the right to run for office because of 
his inability to pay a filing fee. 9 Therefore, both Bullock and 
Lubin illustrate the theoretical underpinnings of an argument 
that declares financial barriers unconstitutional in the political 
system which effectively can exclude candidates from running 
for office. 
Although under-funded candidates are not legally excluded 
my central argument - campaign finance regulations, as exem- from participation, the centrality of money to modern campaigns 
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excludes them in practice. In the wake of Buckley, the costs of 
running for office at all political levels have exponentially in-
creased. Total receipts in Congressional campaigns rose from 
$194.8 million in 1978 to $1.185 billion in 2004.1° Candidates 
seeking office, particularly in statewide campaigns, require vast 
sums of money to purchase television and radio advertising, 
support door-to-door canvassing efforts, and otherwise connect 
with the voting public. Campaign fundraising is highly corre-
lated with electoral success, and it is in general, universally 
accepted that candidate expenditures affect electoral outcomes. 11 
Candidates who win, raise and spend more money than candi-
dates who lose. In 2000, for example, the average Senate candi-
date spent $2.345 million while the average winning Senate can-
didate spent $7.589 million. 12 Although the relationship be-
tween spending and electoral success is not perfectly linear, the 
correlation is striking. 
To the extent that insufficient fundraising constructively 
impairs the ability of candidates from a protected group to com-
pete for elected office, campaign finance laws may present an 
equal protection dimension. Yet, at first glance, the immense 
centrality of money to electoral victory seems unaffected by 
BCRA. In 2000 Senate candidates spent a total of $437 mil-
lion13 and in 2004 they spent $488 million. 14 However, to iden-
tify the equal protection impact of campaign finance reform, one 
must look beyond campaign finance totals to a gendered 
analysis. 
r;r ~1 ".!~AL s ,;:;w \!!": ;JF -p GE \!C R c ii ~'IE \!S or,. ;JF 
(;:p,r,,= 0 A c \! F1t,,At,,CE 
Female candidates for the U.S. Senate crystallize both the 
different fundraising capacities of candidates and the electoral 
consequences of this fundraising dynamic. Even though women 
have been historically underrepresented as both Senators and 
candidates, their numbers in recent 
years are sufficient for statistical 
analysis. To the extent that the fol-
lowing data reveals the disproportion-
ate impact of BCRA on women, exist-
ing campaign finance law also impairs 
the constitutional, political rights of 
female candidates. 
Campaign fundraising posed a 
significant obstacle to female candi-
dates after the 1970s, when women 
first began running for Congress in 
significant numbers. 15 However, sub-
sequent election cycles show a trend 
of steady improvement in the ability 
of female candidates to fundraise successfully. A turning point 
in the electoral experience of female candidates culminated in 
the 1992 election with a breakthrough in their ability to receive 
financial campaign contributions. In 1992, women contested 11 
races for Senate seats and emerged victorious in five, tripling 
their representation in the Senate. During these campaigns, 
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women raised record sums of money, even topping their male 
opponents in the second quarter. 16 Female candidates raised 
more money than men with similar backgrounds and 60% of 
their contributions came from small, direct-mail donations from 
women.
17 Many of the patterns of campaigning and fundraising 
developed then, in 1992, carried into the next decade. 
Carole Jean Uhlaner and Kay Lehman Schlozman's 1986 
study, Candidate Gender and Congressional Campaign Re-
ceipts, is one of the few systematic efforts to analyze competing 
theories of why women are perceived to be at a disadvantage in 
fundraising when compared to their male counterparts. 18 Uh-
laner and Schlozman examined whether gender had an inde-
pendent effect on campaign finance. In conducting their analy-
sis, they factored in gender with other variables, such as incum-
bency status, contested election, party, opponents' receipts, prior 
experience, and vote-share in the previous election. 19 They con-
cluded the relationship between gender and campaign finance 
was not statistically significant; rather, the most relevant predic-
tor of a candidate's receipts was their status as challengers.20 
Since this 1986 study, data and literature by other authors have 
supported Uhlaner and Schlozman's theory. 21 Factors other than 
gender are offered such as support from political action commit-
tees ("PACs"), to account for the disparity in fundraising. 22 
However, as discussed later, this analysis shows that these 
authors have incorrectly concluded that gender has no signifi-
cant effect on campaign finance. When fundraising is disaggre-
gated to consider the sources and amounts given to women, a 
clear difference emerges in the capacity of women to raise 
money from PACs and to collect large individual contributions. 
Similarly, when women are further differentiated into successful 
and unsuccessful candidates, women who win have demonstra-
bly more money than either other female candidates or their 
victorious male counterparts. 
Before I tum to my findings, a brief word is needed on 
my methodology and the limits it pre-
sents for this study. The study con-
cerns the elections of 1998, 2000, 
2002, and 2004. Data was collected 
from the Federal Election Commission 
and The Center for Responsive Poli-
tics23 and analyzes receipts collected 
by all major party candidates during 
this six-year finance period. Each 
candidate's spending has been broken 
down into individual contributions and 
non-party contributions. These cate-
gories have been calculated as a per-
cent of the candidate's total receipts in 
an effort to control for spending disparities between different 
states. Therefore, the variable considered throughout this paper 
is the percent of total money received from the source in ques-
tion. Each percentage is then further considered with respect to 
gender within the various categories of party, result, and candi-
date status. To control for lopsided races and the propensity of 
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women to run as sacrificial candidates in such races, the analysis 
discounts all candidates who failed to gamer 35% of the final 
vote. 
Analysis of the four election cycles raises several baseline 
claims about the fundraising conducted by female candidates for 
the U.S. Senate. As a whole, these propositions remain true 
whether such fundraising was conducted under FECA or BCRA. 
Individual contributions overwhelmingly comprise the most 
important source of financing for all candidates.24 In elections 
conducted under FECA (1998, 2000, and 2002), women col-
lected 71.34% of their contributions from individual donors and 
16.51 % from PA Cs. In 2004, under BCRA limits, women col-
lected 73.13% from individual donations and 20.38% from 
PA Cs. In contrast, men collected 61.32% of their contributions 
in 1998, 2000, and 2002 from individual donors; 68. 72% of their 
total funds came from individual donors in 2004.25 
This proposition holds true in all categories of analysis -
party, candidate status, and race out-
come - and is particularly significant 
in open-seat and challenger races 
of money; to direct discrimination against female candidates; to 
continuing underrepresentation in the professional and social 
networks that serve as major sources of campaign contribu-
tions.29 Ultimately, however, the relevant point is that female 
candidates' tendencies both to depend more heavily than male 
candidates on individual contributions and to receive smaller 
contributions ensure that female candidates must attract far 
greater numbers of individual contributors than their male coun-
terparts just to equalize the total monetary value of their contri-
butions. 
Equalization of contribution totals may not even be suffi-
cient to equalize the electoral outcomes or opportunities of male 
and female candidates. Analysis of aggregate levels of fundrais-
ing demonstrates noticeable differences in the finances neces-
sary for female candidates to run successful campaigns. These 
differences exist in the amount of money necessary to reach the 
35% threshold of campaign viability considered in this essay 
and the amount of money necessary to win a Senate seat. Con-
sidering all four electoral cycles, 
women reaching this 35% mark, on 
average, collected about $7.6 million 
where female candidates are histori-
cally most likely to be concentrated. 
Compared to men, the average female 
candidate in these four election cycles 
raised 7 .22% more of their financing 
from individual donors. Incumbent 
Tlte r!ifl~~,r~~'J'fc·e i,;J~~,~~'rt - or $5 million more than male can-
didates. 
female candidates raised just 5% more 
of their finances from individual do-
nors than incumbent males while 
women running as challengers and for 
--
open seats raised over 12% more of their finances from individ-
ual contributors than their male counterparts raised. 
Women and men raise individual contributions in different 
amounts and from different sources. The vast majority of large 
donors to political campaigns are men.26 Female candidates as a 
whole depend particularly upon female donors for financial vi-
ability and win monetary support from men only as their odds of 
election increase near to certainty.27 Moreover, the average size 
of individual donations to most female candidates continues to 
be smaller than the average donation to male candidates. For 
example, female non-incumbents received 1/4 of all individual 
contributions in amounts less than $200 whereas men received 
about 1/5 of their contributions in these smaller denomina-
tions.28 There are several possible explanations for this discrep-
ancy, ranging from a purported psychological barrier, rooted in 
historic sex-role patterns, against women asking for large sums 
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Additionally, while women who 
win raise significantly more money 
than women who lose, male winners 
collect only marginally more money 
than their loosing counterparts. The 
difference between male winners and 
losers is only about $300,000. In con-
trast, female winners and losers are 
separated by $5 .1 million, a particularly striking discrepancy 
considering that candidates failing to collect at least 35% of the 
final vote have already been excluded from this analysis. Thus, 
for women, $5 million is the price of the mere 15%-point differ-
ence between winning and losing. 
By simply increasing the individual contribution limit from 
$1,000 to $2,000, §307 of BCRA, in effect, exacerbated the fe-
male candidates' disadvantage in each of the three aforemen-
tioned facets of gender-specific fundraising. Simultaneously, 
BCRA enhanced the fundraising capacities of male candidates 
who have always had a greater ability to collect the maximum 
contribution. Therefore, male candidates' greater ability to col-
lect maximum contributions doubled in magnitude under 
BCRA. 
Since the enactment of §307, both male and female candi-
date individual contributions (understood as a percentage of 
their total funding) have increased, but individual contributions 
to male candidates has increased significantly more. In 2004, 
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while female candidates experienced less than a percentage- viability and electoral success. Thus, the decline in the female 
point increase in individual contributions, male candidates re- candidates' fundraising advantage should be interpreted as a 
ceived an eight point jump.30 Male incumbents and candidates decline in their ability to participate in the electoral process. 
who won their races experienced a particularly significant jump It must be noted that in neither the pre- nor the post-
in individual contributions, with male incumbents gaining nearly BCRA periods did female candidates achieve comparable suc-
5% in individual contributions and winning male candidates cess rates to male candidates. Taking the number of female 
gaining nearly 8%. Meanwhile, fe- winners as a percent of the total num-
male candidates in corresponding 
categories either experienced no 
change or actual decline in their rela-
tive individual contributions.31 Effec-
tively, the bump from $1,000 to 
$2,000 has boosted the individual con-
tributions of candidates most capable 
of receiving maximum contributions -
such as incumbents, probable winners 
and male candidates in general. 
Ultimately, BCRA favored male 
candidates by increasing their individ-
ual, and overall, contributions and failing to affect a corollary 
benefit on the fundraising of female candidates. Prior to the 
enactment of BCRA, female candidates averaged $7.33 million 
in total receipts to male candidates' $6.34 million. After BCRA, 
female and male candidates averaged $7.97 million and $7.93 
million, respectively. This phenomenon affected women regard-
less of candidate status. Incumbent female candidates, who had 
previously enjoyed a $3.4 million advantage over male candi-
dates, saw their edge drop by $2 million in 2004.32 Female chal-
lengers were affected even more severely as their total receipts 
declined by more than 1/3, from just over $3 million pre-BCRA 
to $1.9 million in 2004.33 In contrast, male challengers in-
creased their receipts from $5.5 million to $6.2 million, thereby 
raising, on average, over 200% more money than female chal-
lengers. 34 On the whole, because women start out severely un-
derrepresented and have a high propensity to run as challengers, 
the prospect that female challengers cannot fundraise as effec-
tively as male candidates cast grave implications towards the 
representation of women in the Senate. 
CPA L r,.G \!r: ~r; {A's is~"'' ~11r,.A-0Rv ~'iPAC 1 or,. 
\ti;::;r;r r,.·s 'O llCA 'A"".1C1~A1ot,. 
Unquestionably, BCRA is a facially neutral law. Moreover, 
this analysis reveals that BCRA established financial parity be-
tween candidates of different genders insofar as women had 
enjoyed, in the aggregate, a fundraising advantage over men 
prior to BCRA's enactment. However, with respect to the legal 
rights affected by BCRA, the relevant consideration is the de-
gree of effective political participation, enjoyed through the act 
of running for office that candidates of different genders were 
able to exercise by virtue of money raised. Money engenders 
successful candidacy; particularly at the Senate level, fundrais-
ing is crucial to launching a legitimate and successful cam-
paign.35 Female candidates, as demonstrated above, require 
more money than men to reach the thresholds of both campaign 
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ber of successful candidates, women 
were successful in the past four elec-
tion cycles 13.6% of the time on aver-
age.36 In 2004, the proportion of suc-
cessful female candidates did not sig-
nificantly differ from the three prior 
cycles; however, this fact is likely due 
primarily to the high number of in-
cumbent women running and winning 
in 2004 and should not be taken as 
evidence that BCRA did not affect the 
success rates of female candidates. In 
fact, the absence of success by open-seat and challenger candi-
dates in 2004 is strikingly below the historical success rate for 
such candidates, which is about 45% and 5% respectively.37 
Courts have considered equal-protection challenges to cam-
paign finance laws premised on the discriminatory effects of 
campaign finance regulations on political challengers. While 
previous claims are not completely analogous to those of female 
candidates, they are instructive in articulating a theory of harm 
and in understanding the courts' receptiveness to the gendered 
claims raised in this article. The case study presented in this 
article is strengthened to the extent that women are an identifi-
able class to whom the Court has consistently afforded protec-
tion under the equal protection clause. 
In addition to their First Amendment challenges, the Buck-
ley appellants argued that contribution limitations resulted in 
invidious discrimination between incumbents and challengers 
because challengers needed large sums of money to overcome 
the disadvantages of lesser name recognition.38 The Court re-
jected this claim largely on grounds that there was insufficient 
evidence to support it, but, significantly, it did not reject the 
theory itself.39 The Court held that, because there was no evi-
dence that incumbents would benefit more, and because the dan-
ger of corruption is equal among challengers and incumbents, 
Congress had justifiably put fundraising constraints on both 
classes. Still, the Court explained that, even though the law ap-
peared evenhanded on its face, "[t]he appearance of fairness ... 
may not reflect political reality."40 
Likewise, the plaintiffs in McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission made a similar claim that contribution limits dis-
criminated against challengers. The Court dismissed the plain-
tiffs claim for lack of standing, specifically, for the plaintiffs 
inability to show that the alleged injury was fairly traceable to 
§ 307 of BCRA.41 However, the Court remained divided on the 
viability of the theory itself. As Justice Scalia's biting dissent 
stated, "[T]o be sure, the legislation is evenhanded .... [b ]ut as 
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everyone knows, this is an area in which evenhandedness is not 
fairness. If all electioneering were evenhandedly prohibited, 
incumbents would have an enormous advantage."42 
Two federal district court cases further develop this theory. 
In Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life v. Kelley, a pro-life 
candidate alleged that a year-based limit on contributions dis-
criminated against challengers because they generally entered a 
race late in an election cycle whereas incumbents were able to 
raise money throughout their terms.43 The court concluded here 
that it had no basis on which to find that the year-based limit 
discriminated against challengers as a class; thus, the plaintiff 
had failed to carry his burden.44 
Additionally, Driver v. Distefano considered a challenge to 
a Rhode Island statute limiting political contributions to $1,000, 
which the plaintiff argued violated the Fourteenth Amendment 
by impermissibly discriminating against challengers in favor of 
incumbents.45 In expressing at least a theoretical receptiveness 
to the argument, the court went so far as to posit a two-part test 
for its analysis: first, the court must determine whether the stat-
ute employs evenhanded language and is therefore evenhanded 
on its face; then, if it is facially even-
handed, the court must determine 
whether a discriminatory effect exists 
in practice.46 Ultimately, the court's 
decision rests on a rejection of the 
second part of this test in which the 
court did not believe that the statute in 
fact discriminated against challengers. 
The court noted that the available evi-
dence contradicted the plaintiffs 
claim that challengers could catch up 
with incumbents by raising more 
money from contributions in excess of 
$1,000 than incumbents could.47 Therefore, as in Mississippi, 
Buckley, and McConnell, the court here accepted the legal the-
ory but found that the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to 
carry his burden of proving discriminatory effect. 
Empirical support for the proposition that BCRA limits dis-
advantaged female candidates corrects the shortcomings of these 
prior attempts to strike down contribution limits on equal protec-
tion grounds. Additionally, this claim corrects a further weak-
ness in prior formulations - the availability of political participa-
tion is inequitable in regards to poorly funded candidates in gen-
eral, and to female candidates in particular. Although it remains 
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doubtful that the Court will recognize a fundamental right to 
wage equally effective campaigns for elective office,48 the Court 
is inherently more receptive to claims of discrimination levied 
by women by virtue of their nature as a suspect class. 
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Given the Court's baseline recognition of a candidate's fun-
damental right to participate in the political process, the empiri-
cal showing that immutable characteristics, consistently recog-
nized as mandating particular scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, correlate with disproportionate fundraising disad-
vantages highlight the extent to which current campaign finance 
laws violate that right. 49 
The remedies for this particular campaign finance di-
lemma are different from many of the legislative proposals ad-
vocated by campaign finance reformers because many of those 
remedies focus on corruption and free-speech debates. Recog-
nizing that a finance scheme that facially awards female candi-
dates more money than male candidates would be politically and 
constitutionally untenable, I propose 
that the best remedy would be a cap on 
political contributions at the amount 
that all candidates are equally capable 
of collecting. Neither the current level 
nor the pre-BCRA limit is acceptable 
in terms of ensuring equal political 
participation. While further research 
is needed to determine this limit in 
precise dollars, drastically reducing 
the maximum contribution would si-
multaneously equalize the fundraising 
capacity of all candidates and cause 
aggregate campaign receipts to correlate much more closely 
with the extent of each candidate's base support. 
This statistical showing of the discriminatory effects of cur-
rent campaign finance structures exposes the need to expand the 
campaign finance debate to include assurances that regulations, 
like other laws governing electoral participation, operate consis-
tently with the equal protection requirements of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and recognize the rights of candidates 
to enjoy equal opportunity to participate in the political process. 
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